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RADICAL ISLAMISM IN ALGERIA: 
EVOLUTION AND CURRENT SITUATION
Yoslán Silverio González1
The Islamic militants that have been operating in Western Africa Sa-
hara-Sahel during last years have their origins in the 1990s, in the context of 
the internal war that broke in Algeria. This north-African country has been the 
most affected by the violence of terrorism of the Islamic kind, a phenomenon 
that, even though spreading through most of the countries from Northern 
Africa and Middle East, had different impacts on each country. The Algerian 
case was deeply linked to the long civil war faced by this country and, since the 
beginning of the 21st century, turned into a residual element restrained to a 
few Algerian wilayas and expanded towards south, entering the Sahara. Being 
one of the most affected countries, with incidence throughout the rest of the 
region, it is necessary to explain how this problem evolved to become an issue 
of security to lots of nations in the region.
Internal antagonisms: the path to civil war
Thirty years after celebrating its independence of French colonialism 
(1962 - 1992), the Algerian nation broke into an armed conflict, a result of 
its economic difficulties, the exhaustion of the post-independence political 
model and the following state crisis, social pressures and the emergency of 
new political forces that had as its programmatic base the Islam. Under the 
presidency of Chadli Bendjedid (1979 - 1992), third president of the nation, 
the gravest tensions took place as a result of the destabilization of the state 
combined with the rise of Islamist movements. In 1985, the economic crisis 
had worsened due to the slump of oil prices in 1981, compromising the coun-
try’s main source of foreign currency. 
1  Msc. Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional - CIPI, La Habana, Cuba. Email: 
yosilglez@yahoo.es
Yoslán Silverio González
101
In 1960 the Algerian population was composed by a total of 10 800 
000 people and, as of 1985, this number had more than doubled: 21 990 
000 inhabitants (Fayçal 1987, 42). This demographic growth added to the 
economic crisis caused the rise of social pressures. Describing the Algerian 
scenario of these years, Jason Burke states the following: “the grave econom-
ic problems caused and worsened by the growth of population, the massive 
migration towards cities, the inadequate and unplanned urban development, 
corruption and strikes, principally among university professors, slapped the 
faith in the nationalist and socialist ideology of the regime”(Burke 2004, 233). 
In 1988, the large street riots that took place destabilized the country2. For 
these reasons the government, desperately seeking solutions to the domestic 
problems, had to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund and to re-
duce social expenditure (Gutiérrez Mendoza 2006-2007, 34-35). 
Nonetheless, Bendjedid was reelected in 1984 and for the third time 
in 1988, for a five year period. It was in his last mandate that a shift took place 
in Algerian politics, with the beginning of the process of economic opening 
and the transition to a multi-party system, following the constitutional ref-
erendum of February 1989. As the single-party system of the National Libera-
tion Front (FLN) – the party of the independence – ended, new political forces 
arose, such as the Islamic Front of Salvation (FIS), wearing the flag of polit-
ical Islam in its different variants. The FIS, party of the Islamic opposition, 
was legalized on September 14, 1989, and stood ahead of the riots, reaching 
greater popular support. “They took on an important activism inside popular 
mosques (…) they offered a space of exchange and of debate that was absent 
in other ambits of society, supported its inhabitants in moments of natural 
catastrophes, which served to consolidated its leadership” (Rufins 1996, 87). 
As part of this process of political changes, the first multi-party rallies. 
On June 12th, 1990, municipal elections gave FIS a victory with 54.25% of the 
votes counted, an achievement that would mark a tendency of support to the 
Islamic discourse. The FIS won the control, thus, of the majority of Algerian 
communes. The next year, on December 26th,     there was the first round of 
legislative elections, in which the FIS reached a victory with 24.25% of the 
ballots against the FLN, with only 12.17%. The second round of legislative 
elections was suspended when Chadli Bendjedid resigned from the presi-
dency, on January 11th of 1992, as the military intervened and cancelled the 
electoral process. Following the coup d’état, the power was given to the High 
State Committee, which gave the presidency to Mohamed Budief – killed by 
Islamists in June 29th of the same year. 
2  The 1988 protests became known as the “couscous riot”, due to the excessive rise of food 
prices and the endemic poverty.  
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Following these developments the state of emergency was declared 
and, at the same time, FIS was considered illegal and its leaders arrested: 
Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhaj, respectively the President and Vice-President 
of FIS, were condemned to 12 years of jail. The refusal of the Islamist forces 
to accept their marginalization of the political process was their main reason 
for taking up arms against the army. The country turned from then on into 
a generalized theater of military operations. The moderate Islamists of FIS 
had lost the battle in trying to Islamize the Algerian state and, rapidly, were 
substituted by a new wave of violent extremists led by Afghan veterans. Jason 
Burke (2004) considers this process as the step from political Islamism to-
wards more radical tendencies of Islamic activism. 
The most important armed Islamic groups were the GIA and the EIS. 
The activities of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) date back to 1989 and its 
actions heightened due to the void caused by the arrests of the main leaders 
of FIS. This group was nourished by guerrilla fighters who were part of the 
anti-Soviet Islamist militias in Afghanistan, financed and trained by the CIA. 
As the war finished in 1989, many of these internationalist combatants for 
the “cause of Allah” came back to their countries of origin. It is estimated 
that 900 Algerian “Afghans”, as they were known, joined the rows of GIA, 
reinforcing the extremist ideology. They had in their agenda the aggressive 
re-Islamization of the Algerian society through coercion and the practice of 
takfir3, which would be used to justify the attacks against civil population. Pri-
marily, the GIA conducted guerrilla warfare and right away adopted a terrorist 
approach against the Algerian army and population4. In early 1993, the group 
started its terror campaign, attacking military positions, as well as non-mil-
itary objectives including foreigners, intellectuals, journalists and the com-
mon population.
The prohibition of FIS in 1992 produced a stalemate, in which its 
members who were not arrested or sent to camps in Sahara, started to organ-
ize. It was not until 1994 that the armed division of FIS appeared: the Islamic 
Armed of Salvation (EIS), presenting as an alternative to GIA extremists. The 
EIS claimed that the use of violence would force the government to under-
take political changes and allow FIS to turn back to the political process; in 
3  It was considered takfir any Algerian who did not join the fight alongside GIA, thus being an 
unfaithful who should be eliminated. 
4  Abu Qutada, Jordan-Palestinian scholar, acted as official ulema for various radical groups, 
mostly in Algeria since 1994. He became known after stating his opinion regarding a fatwa 
from an Algerian clerk in 1994, in which he supported the idea that the killing of women and 
children in Algeria by the Islamic militants was justified. See in: Jason Burke 2004, 216.  (Note 
of the translation: ulema is a term that refers to an expert in teology and religious law of Islam)
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other words, the return to electoral process was conceived in their program, 
an aspect rejected by GIA leaders. The main support zone for EIS was the 
rural areas. The GIA had adherents among poor and rural young people but 
soon gathered influence also in Algiers and surroundings, gaining its main 
support from urban areas. 
The methods employed by GIA were based in indiscriminate violence 
against civilians. In October 1994, Djamel Zitouni became the national emir 
of GIA. Under his leadership the group focused more in the struggle for pow-
er against EIS than in the opposition to the government (Harmon 2010, 14). 
Their operations therefore did not limit to Algerian lands. Djamel Zitouni 
and his fellows were the ones that undertook the hijacking of the Air France 
Airbus in 1994, the bombing in Paris’ public transport of 1995, as well as the 
kidnapping and assassination of the catholic monks of Tibhirine, in 1996. 
In January 31st, 1994, General Liamin Zerual, Minister of Defense, 
was appointed President of the Republic. Zerual’s mandate’s priority was to 
attain political dialogue with the Islamist opposition and to eradicate the vi-
olence that affected the whole country – objectives that were not attained. In 
November 16th, 1995, new presidential elections were held, giving the victo-
ry to Zerual, the indisputable candidate from the Armed Forces. With his 
election expired the mandate of the High State Committee, in power since 
the ousting of Bendjedid. In the national reconciliation process, the armed 
groups5 had to resign their weapons. While the president negotiated with the 
representatives of political parties and hoped for another moderated variant of 
Islamism, the FIS was still excluded from political dialogue6.
In November 1996 a new constitutional referendum was held, which 
produced the prohibition of Islamist and national berber parties. In the same 
year, it started the massacres appointed to GIA and, in May, the negotiations 
between the Algerian army, led by General Mohammed Boughaba and the 
EIS’ emir, Madani Mezrag. These negotiations had a covert character and pro-
duced two important facts: the release of Abassi Madani in July 1997 and the 
unilateral ceasefire from the EIS, in October.
The divisions inside armed Islamism provoked an increase of vio-
lence and sharpened the Algerian crisis. The researcher Yohanelis Gutiérrez 
5  Among the Islamist armed groups there were also the Islamic Front for Armed Jihad (FIDA) 
and the Movement of the Islamic State (MEI). 
6  The political forces that took part of the National Conference summoned in September 1996 
were represented by: the moderate Islamist faction from the Movement of the Islamic Society 
(MSI –HAMAS) and the Islamic Renaissance Movement (MRI – Ennahda); the ethnic ber-
ber-based opposition parties: the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD); and the opposition 
Party of Algerian Renewal (PRA). See: Rufins 1996, 88-90.
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affirms that the violence had two different sources: the official power and 
the Islamist armed groups (Gutiérrez Mendoza 2006-2007, 49). The Arab 
Cause Solidarity Committee stated that proliferated denounces and testimo-
nies claiming the direct involvement of the government in some of the most 
bloody episodes appointed to Islamist guerrillas and, also, in some of the dis-
appearances and atrocities committed by security forces (Comité de Solidari-
dad con la Causa Árabe 2001, 4).
In January 1996 the GIA declared publicly the war on EIS and in this 
very same year the radical Antar Zouabri became the group’s national emir, 
blaming the civil population of not supporting the jihad. Among the different 
Islamic factions fighting, the GIA gained prominence. The amount of deaths 
in the conflict rose to tens of thousands of people, when the GIA focused their 
attacks on “collaborator” civilians - an extremist approach that costed GIA 
the loss of popular support. The escalation of violence reached its zenith in 
August 19977, being this year the most violent of the whole internal war, with 
more than forty massacres, most of it attributed to GIA. 
In late 1990s, a series of factors had debilitated the GIA. Among 
them there were the successful governmental policy of eradication of extrem-
ist groups and the loss of the small public support they had before, due to its 
extremist policies and violent tactics. The army forces had to some extent con-
trolled the Islamist militias. The principal leaders had fallen during combat8 
or were captured, added to the many others that resigned their arms bearing 
in mind the effective national reconciliation policy of the government. The 
army’s actions forced the GIA to establish in the southern part of the coun-
try, from where they could assure the provision of firearms and finance their 
fight. Terrorist activities became limited to specific areas of the country, espe-
cially in the rural ones such as the southern part of Algerian Sahara. 
In September 1998, Zerual announced that he would leave the pres-
idency and the celebration of presidential elections, in the next year. In April 
1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika9 was elected president, with 73.79% of the votes, 
7  In August 28th, 1997, took place the massacre in Sidi Rais, a local in Algeria’s south, where 
more than 300 people were killed, and it was known as the worst slaughtering of the year. In 
September a massacre in Sidi Youssef had also occurred. 
8  The successive “national emirs” of the GIA Djamel Zitouni, Antar Zouabri (Abu Talha) and 
Rashid Abou Tourab were eliminated by the Algerian security forces. 
9  He was born in March 2nd, 1937. In 1960, he was designed with a Commander rank to the 
Algeria’s southern border to control the so-called “Mali’s front”, in order to avoid the division 
of the country intended by the French colonial power. In 1962, he was elected member of the 
Constituent Assembly and, after, appointed as Minister of Youth, Sports and Tourism of the 
first government of independent Algeria, led by Ahmed Ben Bella. In 1963, he was appointed 
as Foreign Ministry and, in 1964, was elected by the National Liberation Front Congress as 
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the support of the Military General Staff and a presence in the polls of 60.3% 
of the population. In June 27th, 1999, his government approved the project 
of the Law of Civilian Agreement, under which members of the demilita-
rized fundamentalist groups could be reintegrated in society. The GIA had 
announced its will to take part on the process if some requisites were fol-
lowed: the incorporation of their men in the security forces and the release 
of its jailed members in Algeria and abroad (Gutiérrez Mendoza 2006-2007, 
39) – demands which were not accepted.  
In July the amnesty decree was signed to thousands of Islamists who 
had not taken part in crimes of blood and violation. As of September, the 
government submitted this project to referendum, which was accepted by 
98.6% of a population exhausted by a civil war that already lasted seven years. 
Once the law was approved, almost all regretted Islamists were favored by 
the measures. Between 5 and 7 thousands of militants added to the amnesty 
process regardless of the crimes by them committed. As stated by Bouteflika 
himself, the death toll since 1992 surpassed the 100 thousands, and the ma-
terial losses floated around the 20 billions of dollars (Khashana 2001, 84). It 
was not until 2002 that GIA – or, better, what was left of it, since it was deeply 
debilitated – accepted the law.
Foundation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
(GSPC)
Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Algerian war against 
Islamists was changing from a general conflict to a low-intensity insurgency, 
as the Algiers’ authorities had developed a series of military operations at the 
same time that managed the amnesty process of the detainees and arrested 
other Islamists. Most of Islamic militants, practically defeated, gradually de-
parted from the radical vision represented by GIA. In general, the Islamist 
movement in Algeria was becoming more moderate, as they started to accept 
the electoral process. In this context, some of the main leaders of GIA decid-
ed to break with the organization. In 1998 emerged the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat, splitting from the GIA also because of its bad leader-
ship. The creation of this new group meant the disappearing of the first other 
(Ruiz Miguel 2010). In the formation of this armed organization played an 
essential role Hassan Hattab, Shaykh Abu al-Bara – considered the ideologue 
member of the Central Committee of the Political Bureau. In 1974, Boutefika was elected pres-
ident of the 29th session of the UN General Assembly.
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of the group – and Amari Saïfi10. These dissidents had criticized the group’s 
policy of indiscriminately attacking the civilian population. 
His disagreement regarding the civil slaughtering was the main rea-
son for Hassan Hattab breaking up with the group. Among the principles of 
the new Islamist organization, there was the doctrine of attacking only secu-
rity forces and governmental entities. In the first statement emitted by the 
group, in April 1999, Hassan Hattab declared that their enemy was the Al-
gerian government and that the Muslim community should not fear GSPC’s 
activities. He also rejected the doctrine exposed by GIA that a society by itself 
could be in a condition of apostasy, in turn reinforcing the doctrine shared 
by Al Qaeda which blamed the state for the population not following Salafist 
Islam (Gray and Stockham 2008, 93). With this approach, they expected to 
regain the popular support as it was in the years of FIS.
Even though they distanced themselves from the violent methods 
used till then, they were still a radical organization, which did not accept the 
peace process proposed by the authorities. Hattab’s group refused to give up 
their weapons, counting with a number of members that oscillated between 
800 and 1500 militants – as of 2002, nonetheless, they were reportedly 4000. 
The GSPC kept, as its main objective, fighting the secular Algerian govern-
ment. Other targets were the agents that protected foreign employees who 
took part on enginery works and, also, military convoys. The clashes between 
Salafists and Algerian agents happened daily and, practically every week, there 
was the arresting of extremists or attacks in their bases, with a high number 
of casualties. 
Constantly raided by the army, the GSPC had to retreat to two main 
places: the northwestern berber region of Cabilia and to the Algerian Sahara, 
in the southern part of the country. Their main subsidiary kept the fighting 
against state representations in Cabilia and in the mountains of the Tell Atlas, 
around 200km and 300km away from the capital. This region was where 
Algiers and the main urban centers were located. In the large extensions of 
Sahara and in the borderlands with Niger, Mali and Mauritania operated the 
Saharan branch. At a first moment, it was led by Amari Saïfi, with whom the 
links among Islamists and smuggling started. 
Bearing in mind its structure, the organization was divided into 
zones, being the most actives ones only three of them: zones 2, 5 and 9. Each 
one was headed by an emir and divided in katibas or brigades, which, by their 
turn, contained from three to four fassilas, each of them with 12 or 18 men 
10  He was known as El-Para, because served in an Algerian parachutist team. The elite forces 
of some African francophone countries are called “Paras”. 
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(Botha 2009). Zone 2, which had Hassan Hattab as emir, included Algiers, 
Bourmerdes, Tizi Ouzou and Cabilia. Zone 5 focused its attention in the east-
ern part of Algeria, near the border with Tunisia, and its emir was Saïfi already 
since 1999. Zone 9, by its turn, acted in the southern borders of Algeria. 
The period of Hattab’s leadership was characterized by modera-
tion in the group’s actions, by a scarce propagandistic activity and for this 
above-mentioned geographic division of operation zones. The group was ori-
ented to focus on the national jihad at the expenses of a more internationalist 
perspective, which produced several critics from colleagues. As the civil war 
extinguished, and the group suffered defeats, the local commanders felt frus-
trated by the way under which the organization was led. No military advances 
were being achieved. Amari Saïfi soon challenged Hassan Hattab’s authority 
when, contradicting the instruction regarding attacks on civilians, managed 
the kidnapping of 32 European tourists. 
This was the first action directed against foreign interests. The fact 
took place between mid-February to late March, 2003, when the tourists were 
driving with their off-road vehicles around the locations of Ouargala and Dja-
net, in the Algerian Sahara. Seventeen of them were set free in mid-May after 
a rescue operation undertook by the Algerian army in the region of Taman-
rasse11, and a second group was released after paying ransom12.
Thus, the most radical elements inside GSPC’s direction decide to 
depose Hassan Hattab. In September 2003 his leadership was over, with his 
substitution for Nabil Sahroui (Abou Ibrahim Mustafa), old GIA commander. 
The organization did not, however, have great advances in the military realm. 
Following the kidnapping organized by Saïfi, a capture plan was undertaken, 
involving the security forces of Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad in a perse-
cution through the Sahara. The action began when, returning to Algeria, Saïfi 
and his men were detected by the satellite surveillance of the United States.
In March 16th 2004, after several battles that spread through these 
countries, El Para – one of the remaining classic leaders of the Islamic insur-
gency – was captured with some of his followers by the Chadian opposition 
11  Southern Algerian wilaya, whose capital is the homonym city of Tamanrasset. This city is 
placed in the middle of the Ahaggar region and maintains a certain tuareg atmosphere, where 
it is possible to see in the streets numerous tuareg men of the Kel Ahaggar confederation, 
dressed in their traditional way and even riding camels through the main street. Due to its 
altitude – almost 1.400 m –, its climate is not that hot. 
12  The group of tourists was composed by a majority of Germans, 16, followed by 10 Austrians, 
4 Swiss men, a Dutch and a Swedish. The German government was the one which payed the 
ransom of 5 million dollars. See: Algeria Watch 2008.
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group Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad13. With the mediation 
of Libya, they were delivered to Algeria. In another military setback in June 
2004, the emir himself fell on combat together with his three highest ranked 
lieutenants, during a clash with Algerian soldiers in the region of Béjaïa, 
Northeast Algeria –which represented a huge blow to the group. The capture 
of Amari Saïfi and the death of Nabil Sahraoui implied the strengthening of 
the figure of Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, also called Abdelmalek Droukdel and 
who became in 2004 the “National Emir” of GSPC. 
In the political realm, the year was marked by the reelection of Ab-
delaziz Bouteflika, in Abril 8th, with 85% of the votes. In his second mandate, 
the need for stability in the country and for the end of violence was still one 
of the primary objectives of the government’s agenda. To attain these aims, a 
new phase of the peace process was launched under the Project of the Peace 
and National Reconciliation Charter. On November the 29th, 2005, the law 
project was submitted to popular consult and approved on February 27th of the 
next year. With these national reconciliation initiatives, the figure of President 
Bouteflika got stronger. 
This governmental policy presented a challenge to the new leadership 
of Abdemmalek Droukdel. The obstacle was posed as the government’s ac-
tions were getting stronger against the small number of remaining militants 
and the amnesty gave them the possibility of rendition, translated in the de-
sertion of the combatants. In fact the number of troops of GSPC had dropped 
from  the assumed 4,000 in 2002 to less than 500 in 2006.
In order to adapt to these new circumstances the group had, un-
der the leadership of Droukdel, to change their tactics, their structures and 
strategic guidance and also to undertake their operations in a transnational 
scope. The former operation zones in which the group was divided were also 
changed. With the new restructuration only 4 zones remained: the central 
zone (Algeria), East (bordering Tunisia), South (Sahara-Sahel) and West (Mau-
ritania). Militants from other nationalities were increasingly incorporated to 
the group, giving it a regional scope. In other words, their area of activity 
did not limit to Algerian territory. Networks of logistic support were created. 
Suicide attacks came as a new tactic and the group resumed actions against 
civilians, on the other hand, the group incorporated in their strategy a bigger 
effort regarding media divulgation14.
13  Mouvement pour la Democratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) is a rebel Chadian group op-
posed to Idriss Déby’s government. Their most important actions were concentrated between 
1998 and 2003. It was led by Youssouf Togoïmi, old Defense Minister, and acted in the region 
of Bourkou-Ennedi-Tibesti, Northern Chad. 
14  The renovation of the group’s website had been approved (www.almedad/jama3a/) and 
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Mokhtar Belmokhtar surged as a new leader as he took the direc-
tion of the southern zone of the Sahara in January 2005, leading 300 to 500 
militants. One factor that strengthened this group was its responsibility for 
trans-border smuggling. The group started to use the traditional illicit trade 
routes in order to obtain resources – an idea supported principally by Drouk-
del himself. Tobacco was the most smuggled basic product, whose business 
started to be administered by Belmokhtar. 
On June the 4th, 2005, took place the armed attack of the Lemgheity 
garrison, in northern Mauritania, located near the border with Mali and Al-
geria and 400km from Western Sahara. This action was the first undertook 
outside Algerian territory, and in which 150 GSPC militants took part. The 
operation was led by Belmokhtar, causing the death of 15 Mauritanian soldiers 
and injuring 17 others. It put the Mauritanian army in alert, forcing it  to rein-
force the vigilance in this desert triangular area. These events were the result 
of the GSPC’s expansion through the region. In what regards Mauritania, it 
is said that the presence of GSPC’s cells was limited, but certainly there were 
Mauritanians who started training the secret bases of the organization in the 
Algerian desert. Furthermore, there were Islamists involved in the coup at-
tempts of 2003 and 2005 against Ould Taya and even in the successful coup 
that overthrew him in 2005. 
In addition, the group established contact with other extremist groups 
of Maghreb countries. As stated by Stephen Harmon, the main organizations 
with which they related were the Tunisian Islamic Fighting Group and the 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and, according to the author, this connection 
with national jihadist movements strengthened GSPC’s role in the region 
(Harmon 2010, 20-21). At the same time, as it got weaker inside Algeria, the 
GSPC started an infiltration process towards neighboring countries through 
the vast borders and the desert zones. Islamic extremism in Algeria spread 
through the region by the hand of the Salafist militants headed by Abdelmaled 
Droukdel. The pinnacle of the organization enabled a greater association with 
the leaders of the Islamist international movement, headed by Al Qaeda. 
The bonds of Algerian Islamists with Bin Laden: the creation 
of AQIM
The beginning of the internal war in Algeria, in the 1990s, coincided 
the return of the periodic Al-Jama’s, whose last number was released in mid-2006. Its eight 
editions were published very irregularly. About the media activities of the group, see: Soriano 
2010.
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with the period after the end of the Afghan-Soviet war in 1989. This meant 
the victorious return of many mujahideens to their places of origin. The Al-
gerian scenario was seen by these combatants as the ideal context to initiate 
the next great Islamic uprising. In the period between 1991 and 1996, Osama 
Bin Laden had set in Sudan15, presenting himself as an important leader of 
the Islamist movement. In Khartoum, there had representations of several 
Islamist groups, among them the GIA. Since, the links of Algerian closer to 
Bin Laden and the GIA’s directions started. This was not an easy relationship 
and was affected by ups and downs. 
According to Jason Burke (2004), there is little evidence that Bin Lad-
en participated actively in GIA’s activities, which does not mean that there 
was no relationship among them, as they had contact while in Khartoum. 
Nonetheless, the author states that 
the Algerian security forces insist that Bin Laden helped GIA acquiring 
weapons in the beginning. However, this contradicts with declarations of 
former GIA combatants which said that their direction asked economic 
help from Bin Laden in 1994, but they did not like the ideological and op-
erative control demanded by the Saudi as a condition (Burke 2004, 238). 
Even though they did not consolidate formal bonds among leader-
ships, some Bin Laden’s men did collaborate with GIA members, in a person-
al manner. Amari Saïfi, Bin Laden’s brother-in-law, was sent to Algeria with 
40 thousand dollars and the directives to support the Islamist faction that 
opposed the reconciliation with the government (Gray and Stockham 2008, 
92). Saïfi was the director of a jihadist pension in Peshawar16 and leader of 
the Algerian contingent in Afghanistan, which allows us to believe he was a 
person trusted by Bin Laden. Regressing to Algerian he constituted the main 
core around which the GIA was formed. As the war advanced and GIA tactics 
became more violent and indiscriminate against civilians, the international 
rejection and from the Islamic world increased and, above all, from the Al-
gerian population, exhausted by the situation. Other jihadist Arab groups, 
such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, from Ayman al-Zawahiri17, and the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group, publicly broke with the GIA due to its excessive use 
15  Due to the continuous presence of Islamic radicals in Khartoum, the US had included Su-
dan in its list of terrorist sponsors countries in 1993. 
16  Western Pakistani city near the border with Afghanistan, where in 1988 Bin Laden orga-
nized, the first group of Islamists which would become Al Qaeda.
17  Born in Cairo in 1951, he was jailed and tortured during the repression that followed that as-
sassination of Anwar Sadat. He fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets, became Bin Laden’s 
number two and currently is the head of Al Qaeda, following the death of Bin Laden. 
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of violence based on the takfir principle. 
Amar Makhlulif, an Algerian who was trained in Al Qaeda’s camps in 
Afghanistan, was one of the first to suggest to Hassan Hattab to part with the 
GIA (Harmon 2010, 15). This could be an evidence of Al Qaeda’s role in trying 
to implode GIA from the inside. When the GSPC emerged, as it broke from 
GIA, Al Qaeda leaders welcomed the new group. The GSPC embraced Al 
Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad, but Hattab was not eager to promise loyalty 
to Bin Laden and rather kept some distance. “(…) the GSPC, under Hattab’s 
command, supported an alliance with Al Qaeda in which the organization 
would remain mostly independent while its members would be trained by Al 
Qaeda” (Botha 2009, 3)
Al Qaeda had supported Hattab because he represented an alterna-
tive to GIA, but soon showed its dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in 
Algeria in an important moment to the Islamist movement, as it was being 
attack by the international coalition since 2001 in Afghanistan. To prove the 
existence of bonds among GSPC and Al Qaeda, Algerian authorities claimed 
that Imad ibn al-Wahid18, a Yemeni downed by the army near Batha in Sep-
tember 12th, 2002, was an emissary from Bin Laden in the Magreb and Sahel, 
which had recorded a message in which he affirmed Al Qaeda’s approval of 
Algerian Salafism (Mellah and Rivoire 2005). In the year of 2002 Al Qaeda 
sent Abu Muhammad Al-Yamani to Algeria, but Amari Saïfi did not bother 
in presenting him to Hattab, whom he considered a just nominal emir (Gray 
and Stockham 2008, 93).
Bearing in mind the relation among Amari Saïfi and Bin Laden, Hat-
tab’s posture in distancing himself from the Saudi’s direction is understanda-
ble. This attitude from Hattab and his fragile actuation in developing a more 
international and less nationalistic jihad, weighted on the decision of the oth-
er GSPC emirs in deposing him. So, when Sahraoui substituted Hattab, he 
defended a closer relationship with Bin Laden’s organization. In September 
11th, 2003, the anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center, Sahraoui 
submitted a letter to Bin Laden considered as an oath from the GSPC to Al 
Qaeda. However, this political maneuver did not have the expected results, 
at least during Sahraoui’s short mandate, as there were still some doubts for 
the part of Bin Laden regarding the Algerian organization’s real commitment 
towards the global jihad, which meant fighting the “distant enemy”. 
With Sahraoui’s death in 2004, the new emir Abdelmalek Droukdel 
was the responsible for finally getting the organization into Al Qaeda’s orbit, 
18  Anneli Botha recalls this same fact but refers to the Yemeni as Emad Abdelwahid Ahmed 
Alwan. See: Botha 2009.
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which is to say, to complete the integration process in the tactic and meth-
odological realms among the two movements. The context of the new US 
invasion and allies in Iraq (or, as called by the Islamists, the “crusaders and 
the Zionists”), in 2003, was seized by Droukdel to sharpen these bonds. To 
do so, they set training camps for young recruits for the organization which 
would be sent to Iraq in order to fight the Western powers forces. According 
to Gray and Stockham, “Iraq constituted the first large-scale international par-
ticipation of the Algerian jihadists since Afghanistan” (Gray and Stockham 
2008, 94).
Droukdel also declared his support to Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s19 net-
work, which admitted Algerians – principally the younger ones – willing to 
fight in Iraq. Moreover, a public letter from Droukdel to Al Zarqawi was re-
leased where the former recalled the necessity of attacking French soldiers 
and expressed his greetings about the murder of two Algerian diplomats in 
Baghdad20. According to North-American military sources, 20% of the suicide 
attacks in Iraq had Algerian origin (Gray and Stockham 2008, 94). In 2006, 
the GSPC prepared to formalize its reorientation process towards Al Qaeda’s 
principles. Thus, in early 2007, the Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb was created, 
a date that was determined by the change of name of the organization21.
In January 2007, the group announced its new identity: “Al-Qaeda in 
Northern Islamic Africa”, which later would be changed to the official Al Qa-
eda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Since then, relations between Abdelmalek 
Droukdel leader of the GSPC, and Abu Obeida Youssef22, former chief of the 
group’s Council of Notables, deteriorated. The main reason for this was the 
announcement of GSPC’s affiliation to the international Al Qaeda’s network. 
The Council of Notables was dismissed, as it was not consulted in the crea-
tion of the new organization, and finally restructured by Droukdel, ratified 
as “National Emir”. It was recognized, thus, his capacity of leadership, to be 
reaffirmed in this post. From this date on, July 25th 2007, Ayman Al Zawahiri 
– Al Qaeda’s main strategist – began to assist this organization that exalted its 
19  Leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). 
20  The assassination of two Algerian diplomats by jihadists in Iraqi, in July 2003, had a huge 
impact in the country. FIS’ number two, Ali Belhadj, who had been released in the same month 
after a 12 year imprisonment period, were detained on July 27th after being accused of support-
ing terrorism in some declarations regarding the killing, in the Qatari jail Al Jazeera. 
21  In June 2007, the leader of AQIM said that the organization “was created to extol God’s 
word and of the Quran, and to free Maghreb’s people of the hand of corrupts, tyrants and 
traitors, rebuilding the society in the grounds of justice, religion and morality, which will lead 
to spiritual, geographic and political unity, ending divisions and divergences”. See: Reinares 
2010. 
22  “Abu Obeida Youssef” or “Youssef the Annabi” were the alias of Yassid Embarek. 
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position as Al Qaeda representative in the Maghreb. 
According to a report from the German secret services of 2009, relat-
ed to the development of Al Qaeda’s networks around the world, Oscar López 
Fonseca states that Al Qaeda – its main network – is increasingly less a hier-
archic terrorist organization and more  a cloudy amount of jihadist groups. 
Moreover, it has been showing a tendency regarding the tactic formation of 
affiliated groups, in which it impelled local organizations and cells in the at-
tacks, leaving to them the whole planning and execution of the terrorist acts23.
To some researchers, the adoption of Al Qaeda’s brand was a strategy 
of GSPC due to its recent operational debility. Anneli Botha (2009) affirms 
that Al Qaeda would be an ideological reference and, by its turn, could in-
crease its influence in the Maghreb zone. Alternatively, Gray and Stockham 
(2008) see the name changing as the culmination of an evolution of several 
years from the Algerian uprising to its full integration to Al Qaeda, rather 
than a propaganda act or an act of desperation. Both stances have valid ele-
ments, as it is a step of advance towards a farer-reaching entity. 
For his part, Ronan Farrell points that “the association with Al Qaeda 
seems to be at a large extent rhetoric, in the tactical as well as in the strategic 
realm, as the AQIM had adopted the speech, the techniques and the long-
term objectives of Bin Laden’s organization, without having much evidence 
of a logistic or financial relations between the two” (Farrell 2012). To say that 
the existence of direct financial and logistic links among central Al Qaeda and 
AQIM can´t be proven, is not the same as to say the latter can’t be placed in 
the orbit of the international Islamist movement led at the time by Bin Laden, 
and at the same time to maintain its own autonomy and structure. 
Terrorist Incidents in Algeria
 
The International Center for Terrorism Studies of Washington DC, 
USA, and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies of Virginia, released a se-
ries of four reports24 whose responsible was Yonah Alexander, in which the 
23  According to the referred German secret services report about the many Al Qaeda ramifica-
tions, of 2009, in Africa there were at least six groups that maintained links with the network 
run by Bin Laden. The largest of the six is AQIM, being the rest of them: the racial Islamic 
militia Al Shabbab, which fights the Somali government; the Egyptian Al Gamaa Al Islamiya; 
the Sudanese Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Niles; the self-entitled Nigerian Talibans (Boko 
Haram), some members of which had shown their will in incorporating to AQIM and the Lib-
yan Islamic Fighting Group (GICL). See: López Fonseca 2009. 
24  The four reports, made under Yonah Alexander’s coordination, are: Maghreb & Sahel Ter-
rorism: Addressing the Rising Threat from al-Qaeda & other Terrorists in North & West/Cen-
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terrorist incidents produced in Maghreb and Sahel between 2001 and 2012 
were listed. These papers contained the terrorist acts notified by different lo-
cal media vehicles, such as El Watan and Magharebia, in chronological order. 
Looking at these reports, it is perceivable that they were elaborated following 
Western patterns and were directed towards North-American interests. In one 
of the recommendations given by the 2012 report, it is said that the USA 
should expand its anti-terrorist technical assistance through the region, and 
that they should dismantle the refugee camps of the Polisario Front in Tin-
douf so that they could no longer serve as a recruitment base for terrorist and 
smugglers (Alexander 2012, 6-7). 
Reading the information compiled by these documents regarding 
three Western Sahel countries, Mauritania, Mali and Niger, some contradic-
tory aspects in this investigation is perceived regarding their classification of 
terrorists. Following its descriptions, these institutes defined as terrorist at-
tacks the actions of the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice inside Niger. 
In this organization Nigerien tuaregs that fight against Niamey’s government 
for their political and economic rights were included. In Mali’s case, most of 
the facts regarded as terrorists between 2007 and 2009 are attributed to tuar-
eg militias which during these years held another of their historic rebellions 
against Bamako. These examples show the political and ideological stances of 
its authors. 
The first action claimed by AQIM in Niger did not happen until De-
cember 18th, 2008, when they kidnapped the UN special envoy altogether with 
his assistant; in Mali, the first report of tourist kidnapping undertaken by 
AQIM members was in 2009. It was in this year that their actions started in 
the northern part of Mali: on July 11th, 2009, they murdered the intelligence 
official Lamana Ould Cheikh at his home in Timbuktu, following orders by 
the cells under Abou Zeid responsibility. This action provoked the response 
from the army, in which about 26 Islamists were detained near the border 
with Algerian. On January 5th, a grenade exploded in the French embassy in 
Bamako. In Mauritania, the first action with reportedly AQIM participation 
was on December 26th, 2007, when a military patrol was attacked. On Feb-
ruary the 1st, 2008, an armed man opened fire against the Israeli embassy in 
Nouakchott. In 2009 a North-American was murdered in this same capital 
and, also, a suicide bomber exploded near the French embassy in the country. 
The rest of the attacks in these three countries relate, fundamentally, 
tral Africa of January 2010; The Consequences of Terrorism: An Update on al-Qaeda and other 
Terrorist Threats in the Sahel & Maghreb of 2011; Special Update Report Terrorism in North, 
West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring; Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 
2012: Global Reach & Implications, of 2013. 
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to the kidnapping of Western people as it can be seen in annex 13. Despite 
their approach, these reports were of great use as they enabled the use of the 
same data to get other results. In the reports, just the following table (Alexan-
der 2013, 20) appears as processed information, where are displayed the set 
of attacks considered by its authors as terrorists. 
Data Table - Terrorism Incidents in Maghreb & Sahel since Sept. 11, 2001
following table (Alexander 2013, 20) appears as processed information, where are displayed 
the set of attacks considered by its authors as terrorists.  
 
  
 
   
 Undoubtedly, Algeria has been the country that suffered the most with AQIM terrorist 
acts, which was why the information given by the reports was quite ample, enabling the 
processing of data from each of the Algerian press offices. To this research 23 variables were 
extracted as a result of computing the 1234 attacks notified by the Algerian press. With a 
more detailed analysis of each of these incidents, the following tables and charts were 
elaborated: 
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Table I - Algeria: Victims of Terrorist Attacks
Indicators/Year
Subtotal
Civil Victims
Kidnappings
Military
Victims
Injured
Injured
Killed
Killed
Nationals
Foreigners
Bomb explosions
Suicidal
Homemade bombs
Ambushes
Simultaneous Attacks
Muslim Casualties
Muslims arrested
Attacks to public places
Defused bombs
Road bombs
Car bombs
Indicators/Year
Indicators/Year
Boumerdés
Tizi Ouzou
Bouïra
Skikda
Béjaïa
Tebessa
Argel
Table 2 - Algeria - Terrorist Incidents
Table 3 - Algeria - Regions most affected by terrorist incidents
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One of the variables used was the one of “attacks attributed to: GIA, 
GSPC and AQIM”. The result showed that of these attacks only 13 were attrib-
uted to GIA between 2001 and 2003; a total of 74 to the GSPC between 2001 
and 2006; and 49 to the AQIM, between 2007 and 2012. These numbers 
express a methodological problem, as they solely point the amount of actions 
which these organizations claimed as theirs. Most of the reports, between 
2007 and 2012, did not specify which of these groups claimed the attacks. 
The majority of the terrorist actions in this same period took place in the prov-
inces of Boumerdés, Tizi Ouzou and Bouira, which are part of the mountain 
region of Cabilia, where AQIM has its main base. This allows us to say that 
most of the attacks reported were undertaken by members or recruits from 
the AQIM, the organization which has the military capacity to hold this kind 
of action in the region. More than 70% of the registered attacks took place in 
the Boumerdés and Tizi Ouzou provinces, as it can be seen by the following 
chart. 
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One of the variables used was the one of “attacks attributed to: GIA, GSPC and 
AQIM”. The result showed that of these attacks only 13 were attributed to GIA between 2001 
and 2003; a total of 74 to the GSPC between 2001 and 2006; and 49 to the AQIM, between 
2007 and 2012. These numbers express a methodological problem, as they solely point the 
amount of actions which these organizations claimed as theirs. Most of the reports, between 
2007 and 2012, did not specify which of these groups claimed the attacks. The majority of the 
terrorist actions in this same period took place in the provinces of Boumerdés, Tizi Ouzou 
and Bouira, which are part of the mountain region of Cabilia, where AQIM has its main base. 
This allows us to say that most of the attacks reported were undertaken by members or 
recruits from the AQIM, the organization which has the military capacity to hold this kind of 
action in the region. More than 70% of the registered attacks took place in the Boumerdés 
and Tizi Ouzou provinces, as it can be seen by the following chart.  
 
 
Different types of attacks were compiled in Table II. The use of explosives has been 
the most used method by the AQIM inside urban zones in Algeria. Inside this variable, there 
are diverse variations such as car-bombs, road bombs, homemade bombs or improvised 
explosive devices (IED), mine explosions, remote control bombs or cell phone bombs, the 
use of fanatics who suicide in public places or that exploded cars against public facilities such 
as police offices, simultaneous explosions and bombs hided inside police patrols or even 
inside corpses. The use of these artifacts, which in most of the cases were roughly fabricated, 
increased significantly until 2009 and 2010.  
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Algeria: Regions Most Affected by Terrorist Actions
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The actions undertaken by the Algerian army and special forces to-
wards the dismantling of explosive devices reduced the effectivinness of this 
kind of attack in Algeria. Observing the periods between 2010 and 2011 in the 
charts the numbers indicate an inverse relation among the increase of bomb 
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deactivation and the significant diminution of the explosions. The 2012 bomb 
detonations resulted much less effective about the number of affected people. 
A great part of the attacks in this year did not produce a large number of mor-
tal victims, which were also reduced by these actions. 
The actions undertaken by the Algerian army and special forces towards the 
dismantling of explosive devices reduced the effectivinness of this kind of attack in Algeria. 
Observing the periods between 2010 and 2011 in the charts the numbers indicate an inverse 
relation among the increase of bomb deactivation and the significant diminution of the 
explosions. The 2012 bomb detonations resulted much less effective about the number of 
affected people. A great part of the attacks in this year did not produce a large number of 
mortal victims, which were also reduced by these actions.  
 
 
In this chart AQIM’s capacity in installing bombs in Algeria is displayed. The 70% of 
bombs set that were detonated, were not classified by the press in any of the pointed 
categories. Among the kind of devices used, stand out the roughly produced and handmade 
ones. If we add the total of detonated bombs with the amount of devices dismantled by the 
army, it can be affirmed that the explosive power in the hands of Islamist cells has been much 
bigger.  
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On January 17th, 2002, Mohamed Laid Khelfi, security chief of the Ilizi region, was 
kidnapped near the border with Libya.  
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trols, military convoys and the installation of fake controls in highways by us-
ing uniforms of the Algerian army. The rest of the attacks were done through 
skirmishes or shootings among moderate Islamists and official forces, attacks 
against control posts, army garrisons and the kidnapping of military person-
nel. On January 17th, 2002, Mohamed Laid Khelfi, security chief of the Ilizi 
region, was kidnapped near the border with Libya. 
The attacks in public locations are referred to in a broad variety of ac-
tions in which are included armed attacks to cafeterias, explosions in cinemas 
and stadiums, hijacking of passenger buses and simple but mortal attacks in 
funerals or weddings. The explosion of lots of car bombs during small periods 
of time has been a mode of simultaneous attack equally employed. Its level 
of impact in society is much bigger due to the high number of victims it can 
provoke, among which are not only the people who were in the place, but also 
the ones who had gone there to help the wounded. 
Another group of attacks focused against apartment complexes and 
in the assassination of students or government figures as members of the 
parliament, regional political leaders or local authorities. Between 2006 and 
2012 at least 29 political figures were killed, pertaining to different levels in-
side state apparatus. These killings were also directed against people suspect-
ed of collaboration with security services, government whistleblowers or Isla-
mists included in the amnesty process, the so-called deserters of the Islamist 
cause. In 2011, at least five “regretted” terrorist were physically eliminated by 
AQIM. They have undertaken, moreover, sabotages in economic facilities of 
the country, such as the pipelines of the National Gas Company. 
About Table I, the one referring to victims of terrorist attacks, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that these numbers express an estimate minimum 
of the amount of people affected and, also, who had been noted in the very 
same moment of the terrorist act. All reports indicate the immediate victims, 
and none of the cases consulted affirmed how many of the wounded, for ex-
ample, died after. An additional problem is that in some of the reports it was 
not specified the exact number of deaths and wounds, rather attributing an 
indeterminate sum. In other cases a concrete number was given, but without 
defining how much of it corresponded to military forces and how much to ci-
vilians. This means that the real number of victims is much bigger than these 
numbers recognize. Nonetheless, lots of interpretations could be done with 
the data gathered, as well as to point some general tendencies. 
A first observation to be done at first sight is that the year of 2007 
was undoubtedly the most violent inside Algeria. This date coincides with the 
year of creation and adoption of the new fight conceptions inside AQIM. The 
civilian victims were considerable. 
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Civilian Victims
In the 2007-2012 period the amount of victims decreased more than 
three times than the one in 2007, falling to 961 from a former amount of 268. 
From 2007 on the general tendency was of a permanent decline of the num-
ber of victims – including civilian and military. This was due to the work done 
by the security forces in neutralizing the terrorist actions, a factor related to 
the rising tendency in deactivating bombs set by the Islamists, as it is shown 
in the chart related to this variable, which was explained above. 
Algeria: Civilian Victims of Terrorist Attacks
military. This was due to the work done by the security forces in neutralizing the terrorist 
actions, a factor related to the rising tendency in deactivating bombs set by the Islamists, as it 
is shown in the chart related to this variable, which was explained above.  
 
 
 Nonetheless, if a comparative analysis is made having in mind the military and 
civilian victims in separate, it follows the conclusion that the majority of the affected people 
between 2007 and 2012 pertains to the military sector – soldiers, security personnel, police 
and officials.  
 
 
 In 2007, when AQIM was created, the organization broke with the principle instituted 
by Hassan Hattab of not focusing the attacks against civilians. Just in 2007 the numbers cited 
above of civil deaths and wounds were produced. This was not due to an abandonment of this 
method by part of the group’s leaders, but rather because they were increasingly surrounded 
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Nonetheless, if a comparative analysis is made having in mind the 
military and civilian victims in separate, it follows the conclusion that the ma-
jority of the affected people between 2007 and 2012 pertains to the military 
sector – soldiers, security personnel, police and officials. 
Algeria Victims of Terrorist Attacks
In 2007, when AQIM was created, the organization broke with the 
principle instituted by Hassan Hattab of not focusing the attacks against civil-
ians. Just in 2007 the numbers cited above of civil deaths and wounds were 
produced. This was not due to an abandonment of this method by part of the 
group’s leaders, but rather because they were increasingly surrounded by the 
army. Most of civilians were wounded in the indiscriminate explosive attacks 
when they were trapped in crossfire or trying to rescue an injured. 
Regarding the kidnappings, activity for which the AQIM became 
known internationally, the numbers indicate that in Algeria’s case the ones 
directed against Algerians themselves were more numerous than against for-
eigners, tourists and workers. The most widely known case was the one of 
2003, when the GSPC kidnapped 32 European tourists. In 2007, AQIM kid-
napped three Chinese workers. The actions against foreigners in the country 
were very marginal. This is an example that shows that the most affected by 
attacks and kidnappings undertaken by Islamic terrorist, were the Muslims, 
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rather than Westerners. 
Military Victims
Recent Developments (2013-2014)
The “Arab Spring”, triggered in Northern Africa, provoked distur-
bances and political change in Tunisia and Egypt, while in other scenarios it 
was used as a pretext to depose legitimate governments as the one of Libya. 
In particular, the disarticulation of the Libyan state, as a result of the NATO 
invasion, provoked widespread destabilization in the Sahel region, in which 
the main example was the Islamist offensive against Bamako and the fol-
lowing French-African military intervention in Mali. The situation described 
was identified as a direct menace to Algeria’s security, as all of its borders 
in east, south and southwest flanks were under military pressure. This was 
the favorable context for the AQIM Islamists to reactivate their actions inside 
Algeria. 
The most significant example was the attack against a gas facility in 
In Amenas, in eastern Algeria, which pertained to British Petroleum. This 
fact happened on January 16th, 2013, five days after the French intervention 
in Mali. The action was claimed by Belmokhtar’s group, which had split up 
from AQIM in December 2012 (Oumar 2013). This action was a response to 
the developments in Mali and a means to show AQIM its capacity to conduct 
large-scale operations. They seized 792 hostages, among Algerian and for-
eign workers, executing 23 of them of British, French and North-American 
nationalities. This fact became known as the hostage crisis and provoked a 
strong military response from the Algerian army. 
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According to the fifth report of the Inter-University for Terrorism 
Studies, during the rest of 2013 terrorist actions showed a tendency of re-
duction. Besides the In Amenas attack, just 26 cases of civil victims were 
reported, most of them injuries, while the military was still the most affected 
sector, with almost 60 deaths and 14 injuries – still, comparing with former 
years, the number was way smaller. The same tendency was shown regarding 
the amount of bomb explosions: in comparison with 2012, with 72 cases, 
2013 had only 27, far less than half of the former. About the geographic dis-
tribution of the actions, these were still concentrated in the Cabilia region: in 
Bouira (8 attacks), Tizi Ouzou (7) and Boumerdés (4) (Alexander 2014). So, in 
comparison with 2012, the attacks as well as the victims from terrorist attacks 
diminished to less than half. 
In the regard of terrorist groups´ actions, the most important fact of 
2014 at an international level, was the rise of the self-entitled “Islamic State” 
(IS) and of its caliphate created between Syria and Iraq. Its emergency had 
an impact on the rest of the former Al Qaeda followers around the world, 
causing important ruptures among its affiliate groups which, till then, led 
the global jihad and was displaced by the new group. This influence also was 
felt inside AQIM, whose command center is in Algeria. The contradictions 
among the two groups started in July 2014, when the IS demanded AQIM’s 
loyalty for its “caliphate”. The leader of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdel, reject-
ed the request and restated his fidelity to Al Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s 
successor in Al Qaeda. Groups such as Ansar al-Sharia (The Supporters of 
the Sharia) in Tunisia and Libya had expressed their loyalty to Al Baghdadi, 
Islamic State’s “caliph”, even raising the possibility of creating a group called 
Islamic State of the Islamic Maghreb (ISIM). 
In Algeria’s case, the separation did not linger and, in September 
2014, emerged the organization called Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria. The 
militia is headed by Gouri Abdelmalek25, known as Jaled Abu Suleiman, who 
declared his loyalty to the Islamic State. Obviously it is a small cell without 
great possibilities of development, but that complicates even more the rela-
tions among Algerian Islamist radicals. These fragmentations are an example 
of their debilities in Algeria. Also they show that: Algeria terrorist cells are in-
creasingly disarticulated; they do not have popular support at all; their actions 
concentrate on increasingly less points of national geography, mostly in the 
isolated mountains of Cabilia and in some determined places of Sahara; and, 
at last, the Algerian state and armed forces have a solid and radical strategy to 
25  Gouri Abdelmalek was AQIM’s chief in the central region of Algeria. Known as Jaled Abu 
Suleiman, he is 36 and known as comes from the city of Boumerdés. He had been condemned 
to death for his involvement in the death attacks against a commissary in Thenia of 2008, and 
spent some years in Tizi Ouzou’s jail. 
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completely eliminate these remaining terrorists and guarantee the security of 
Algeria’s citizens, contributing, with their experience, to the antiterrorist fight 
in the Sahel region. 
REFERENCES 
Alexander, Yonah. 2010. Maghreb & Sahel Terrorism: addressing the Rising Threat 
from al-Qaeda & other Terrorists in North & West/Central Africa. 
______. 2011. The Consequences of Terrorism. An Update on al-Qaeda and other 
Terrorist Threats in the Sahel & Maghreb. 2011 Report Update. Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, International Center for Terrorism Stud-
ies. http://www.potomacinstitute.org/publications/reports/icts/1682-
the-consequences-of-terrorism-update-on-al-qaeda-and-other-terrorist-
threats-in-the-sahel-maghreb
______. 2012. Special Update Report Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: 
From 9/11 to the Arab Spring. International Center for Terrorism Studies. 
______. 2013. Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implica-
tions. Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. 
______. 2014. Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2013. Fifth Annual Report. 
Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. 
Algeria Watch. 2008. What Happened to Hassan Hattab and Amari Saïfi (alias Ab-
derrezak El Para)? http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/hr/followup_hrc.htm
Botha, Anneli. 2009. “Islamist  Terrorism in the Maghreb: Recent developments in 
Algeria.” Circunstancia 18 año VII.  http://www.ortegaygasset.edu/publica-
ciones/circunstancia/ano-vii---n--18---enero-2009/ensayos
Burke, Jason. 2004. Al Qaeda. La verdadera historia del islamismo radical. Barcelo-
na: RBA Libros SA.
Comité de Solidaridad con la Causa Árabe. 2001. “Revuelta social en Argelia.” 
Nación Árabe 45 año XV. 
Farrell, Ronan. 2012. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Challenges from 
North Africa. 
Fayçal, Nassib. 1987. “Dynamique démographique et stagnation économique.” 
Arabies 4. 
Gutiérrez Mendoza, Yohanelis. 2006-2007. Argelia: apuntes para un balance. Es-
tudio Integral sobre Argelia. La Habana, Cuba: Centro de Estudios sobre 
África y Medio Oriente. 
Gray, David, and Erik Stockham. 2008. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: the 
evolution from Algeria Islamism to transnational terror.” African Journal 
Yoslán Silverio González
125
of Political Science and International Relations 2 (4): 91-97. 
Harmon, Stephen. 2010. “From GSPC to AQIM: The evolution of an Algerian 
islamist terrorist group into an Al-Qaeda Affiliate and its implications for 
the Sahara-Sahel region.” Concerned Africa Scholars, Bulletin 85: 12-29. 
Khashana, Rashid. 2001. “Estados Unidos vs Unión Europea. Seguridad en el 
Magreb y nuevo orden mundial.” Nación Árabe 43 año XIV.
López Fonseca, Óscar. “Al Qaeda apadrina a una veintena de grupos terroristas.” 
Público, March 01. http://www.publico.es/internacional/205184/al-qae-
da-apadrina-a-una-veintena-de-grupos-terroristas
Mellah, Salima, and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire. 2005. “Who staged the tourist kidnap-
pings? El Para, the Maghreb’s Bin Laden.” Le Monde Diplomatique, Feb-
ruary. http://mondediplo.com/2005/02/04algeria
Oumar, Jemal. 2013. Al-Qaeda details split with Belmokhtar. http://magharebia.
com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2013/06/06/feature-01
Reinares, Fernando. 2010. “¿Qué es AQMI?” El País, August 24. http://elpais.
com/diario/2010/08/24/espana/1282600808_850215.html
Ruiz Miguel, Carlos. 2010. Dudas y sospechas sobre Al Qaida del Magreb Islámico. 
http://www.gees.org/files/article/05102010174427_Analisis-08159.pdf
Rufins, Olga. 1996. “Argelia: ¿alternativa para una solución?” Conflictos en África 
y Medio Oriente. Revista de África y Medio Oriente 13 (1) 
Soriano, Manuel Torres. 2010. “La nueva estrategia propagandística de al-Qaeda 
en el Magreb Islámico.”  ARI 87/2010. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.
org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elca-
no/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari87-2010
ABSTRACT
The present article addresses radical Islamism in Algeria, encompassing the period 
between the rise and radicalization of the first Islamist groups, during the Civil War 
(1992-2002), and their activities in recent years. The study analyses aspects such as the 
tactics used by them, the rise of new groups and the fall of the old ones, as well as the 
impacts of these developments on the political scenario of Algeria. 
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